. Recent work in this area has focused on unpacking the preferences of firms for (or against) specific types of social policy as part of a broader labor market strategy designed to attract skilled workers and quite labor unrest (Kuo, 2010 , Martin, 2005 , Yang, 2013 . 1 As with much of the work on the evolution of the welfare state, however, existing work on firms' preferences has tended to concentrate on the developed world, where governments can credibly commit to policy and mechanisms exist to hold the bureaucracy accountable for implementation. As a consequence, we know relatively little about how (and even whether) institutional quality shapes preferences for social policy (Mares and Carnes , 2009) . 2 The failure to consider the effect of institutional quality, and its mechanisms, is surprising. Conceptualizing institutions as humanely devised constraints on human interaction (North, 1981) , work on the political economy of institutions and investment highlights how a lack of constraints creates credible commitment problems between the state and investors. Where institutions are poor, state officials can take advantage by engaging in weak or opportunistic policy enforcement and outright rent-seeking, which increases investor risk and transaction costs (North, 1990 , North, Wallis, and Weingast, 2009 , North and Weingast, 1989 .
Knowing this, rational firms invest at lower levels, since these additional costs weaken returns. A rapidly growing literature shows that not everyone loses. Those able to protect themselves from the state, whether by leveraging political connections or simply evading notice, can find themselves at a competitive advantage due to their ability to shift or mitigate the costs of poor institutions (emphc.f. Boix and Svolik (2013) , Gehlbach and Keefer (2011), Haber, Maurer, and Razo (2003) ). Some can even profit from the unique opportunities afforded by unconstrained state representatives willing to privilege their friends (Faccio, 2006 , Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell, 2006 , Gehlbach, 2008 .
In this paper, I argue that these insights can be extended to inform our understanding of businesses' preferences for social policy. As with standard investments, individuals and firms pay into the welfare state today expecting benefits, when eligible, tomorrow. As with all investment, however, social policy contributions are vulnerable to opportunism and rent-seeking. Consequently, contributions may never be paid out in full or as legally stipulated, making poor institutions like dead-weight costs. Extending existing individual level models of preferences for social policy would suggest that the increased dead-weight costs of poor institutions dim enthusiasm for social policy (Becker, 1985 , Meltzer and Richards, 1981 .
Using this work as a point of departure, I argue that not everyone loses (or at least not to the same extent) from poor institutions. In particular, I identify two groups who can mitigate the costs of social policy and whose ability to do so are enhanced in poor institutional settings. On the one hand, those who have strong political connections may receive privileged access to social policy funds for their employees and protections against rent-seeking and opportunism for their contributions. On the other hand, some firms may be able to take advantage of weak institutions, and the shirking they encourage, to hide some or all of their wage bill, allowing them to sidestep social policy contributions , Schneider, 2005 ).
Free-riding is possible, because even where the welfare state is a leaky bucket unable to collect enough tax revenue to fully sustain its expenditures, many still receive social policy benefits (Kaufman and Kaliberda , 1996) . 3 Because cross-national surveys of firms are rare, I test these two hypotheses directly using a unique survey of 666 Russian firms carried out in 11 Russian regions. A single country survey, especially one with relatively centralized tax and social policy structures like Russia, precludes problems with differences in welfare state design and financing (Kenworthy and McCall , 2008) . It also mitigates concerns about other important unobservable (or poorly observable) variables such as those related to culture or the historical legacies of intitutions. Due to the small number of regions in my sample, it is difficult to test whether the preferences of well-connected firms and those who can hide differ across settings with varying institutional quality. Instead, I focus on a narrower element of the argument: do well-connected firms and those who can hide support social policy as my framework predicts? I assume that while substantial variation exists in the quality of Russia's regional institutions, even the "best" regions still have poor institutions by global standards. Russia is an ideal subject for such a study, as it was struggles with basic institutional constraints.
The World Bank's Governance Indicators, for example, place Russia in the bottom 23% of countries with respect to its ability to control bureaucrat corruption, while Russia's Rule of Law ranking (a measure of contract enforcement and the quality of police and courts) put it in the bottom 20% of countries (Kaufman et al. , 2006) . 4 As such, Russia provides a good test of how firms behave in institutionally poor settings. This paper makes two contributions to the literature on social policy preferences. First, as noted above, it extends our understanding of firm preferences to settings not considered in the existing literature. Poor institutions are endemic in the developing world, making an understanding of whether (and how) they shape firm preferences critical to making predictions about the rise and evolution of the welfare state. Knowing who supports the welfare state in poor institutional settings can also help to resolve the long-standing puzzle of welfare state origins and development in authoritarian and poorly institutionalized settings (Mares and Carnes , 2009 ). Second, this paper contributes to the welfare state literature methodologically through the use of micro-level, firm surveys. The most prominent work on firm preferences has used archival materials from businesses and business associations to expand our understanding of firm preferences and lobbying (c.f. Kuo (2010) , , Mares (2003a Mares ( , 2001 , Swensen (2002 Swensen ( , 1991 , Thelen (2004) . This paper seeks to complement these studies with new data and methodology, bringing with it the traditional advantages of large-N survey work.
In the next section, I present a framework that identifies groups who benefit from poor-institutional settings in ways that enhance support for social policy. Section 3 briefly discusses the political and social policy contexts in Russia in the mid-2000's, the period of interest of this study. Section 4 introduces the survey instrument and discusses the empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the results of the main analysis, robustness checks, and a validation exercise of the conceptual validity of the measures. Section 6 concludes.
Firm Level Preferences for Social Policy
While there are potentially many different dimensions to welfare state policy -degree of redistribution, social justice, risk pooling, financing, etc. -for simplicity here I focus primarily on two: generosity and control. 5 Along the generosity dimension, existing work has largely characterized firms' preferences as a function of firms' overall production strategy. Firms support generous welfare states where the anticipated effect of social policy on the overall make-up of the labor market and labor costs complement the firm's labor market strategy. As a tool for shaping the labor market, social policy decreases costs by helping employers and employees to overcome credible commitment problems and encourages co-investment in skills (Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice, 2001 , Mares , 2001 , Thelen, 2004 . Social insurance backstops employee investment in human capital by mitigating risk , Moene and Wallerstein, 2001 , Rehm, 2009 , while allowing employers to take advantage of economies of scale to offer larger compensation packages (Mares , 2003a ,b, Swensen, 2002 . This increases the overall supply of skill and makes 5 Existing work has yet to agree on which dimensions are actually most important and typologies vary widely based on author. For examples of different approaches, c.f. Hausermann (2010) , Kato (2003) , Myles and Pierson (2001) , van Oorschot and Meuleman (2012) , Pierson (2001) , Sabbagh (2006) . 4 it easier for firms to acquire skilled employees, benefiting those who utilize highly skilled workers.
As a tool for shaping labor costs, social policy can decrease the cost of skilled labor by placing effective floors on wages. This disrupts the ability of firms to compete by deskilling and engaging in "ruinous product market competition" premised on a race to the bottom in wages (Swensen (1997) :74) . It also helps firms to compensate employees for the risks and uncertainty of the business cycle, particularly for exposed sectors or during economic downturns. 6 By improving the supply of skilled workers in the labor market and lowering the costs of acquiring such highly skilled workers, social policy produces benefits for high-skill firms that surpass the costs. Consequently, the more firms depend on skill, the more generous a welfare state they will support.
Firms also care about who controls social policy. In her seminal work, Mares (2003a) argues that preferences over who controls the welfare state depend on the trade-off between administrative costs and discretion over compensation packets. On the one hand, internalizing the costs of social policy administration is expensive and state control spreads these costs more widely. On the other hand, firms that internalize the costs of social policy also have more control over programs and can use them to reinforce their labor market strategies. Mares (2003a) predicts that large firms, whose size allows them to achieve economies of scale, will support employer controlled social policy.
To understand how poor institutions alter the predictions above, it is first important to note that there are commonalities between models of individual and firm level preferences for social policy. As with the prevailing (Meltzer and Richards, 1981) model, firms look to maximize their net gains from social policy contingent on their tax contributions and any dead-weight costs of taxation. 7 Whereas for individuals the benefits come in the form of direct transfers, for firms benefits accrue through the indirect effect of transfers on the labor market and labor costs. Where workers receive high rates of transfers (directly or in expectation) or are encouraged to invest heavily in skills, firms with high-skill production strategies benefit more (Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice, 2001 , Moene and Wallerstein, 2001 . The relative ratio between these benefits, taxes, and the extent to which contributions are subject to wastage (i.e. dead-weight costs) can be thought of as determining whether a given firm supports generous social policies.
Control enters into this framework in that it governs the extent to which firms can explicitly use social policy 6 For an elaboration of the theoretical underpinning the argument with respect to the openness of the economy, c.f. Adsera and Boix (2002) , Cameron (1978) , Garrett and Mitchell (2001) , Rodrik (1998 Rodrik ( , 1997 . Swensen (2002) provides an elaboration of this argument during economic downturns, providing evidence with respect to the strategies of high-skill US firms during the Great Depression, c.f. pp. [38] [39] [40] For more modern extensions of this model, c.f. Alt and Iversen (2013) , Iversen and Soskice (2001) , , Moene and Wallerstein (2001) . to reward skilled workers, which is one component of the labor market's structure and costs.
An implicit assumption of existing models of both firm and individual level preferences for social policy is the notion that contributions today will be collected and paid out tomorrow as prescribed by law. 8 Weak institutions challenge this assumption, however, by weakening the accountability links between lower level state officials and politicians, on the one hand, and between politicians and the populace, on the other (North, 1990 , North, Wallis, and Weingast, 2009 , North and Weingast, 1989 . The inability to hold these groups accountable, leads to two related problems for the welfare state that in turn shape preferences for social policy.
First, in the absence of constraints on their behavior state officials are faced with temptation to engage in direct rent-seeking at the expense of the populace (Boix and Svolik, 2013 , Brownlee, 2007 , Geddes, 1999 , Gehlbach and Keefer, 2011 , Magaloni, 2008 , Olson, 2000 , 1993 , Reuter and Remington, 2009 and to alter policy commitments made today if changing circumstances decrease their utility from these policies tomorrow (Frye, 2010, Kydland and Prescott, 1977) . Consequently, neither firms nor individuals can be sure that social policies will not be abused today or altered tomorrow in ways that generate rents for state officials at the expense of the populace. If one adapts and extends the logic of dead-weight costs from existing models to cover the costs of weak institutions, then this suggests that bad institutions decrease the pool of benefits to be distributed to individuals. Because most (including firms) expect fewer net benefits due to these costs, they are more likely to oppose social policy (Becker, 1985 , 1983 , Meltzer and Richards, 1981 . Only where social policy is taken out of the hands of the state (i.e. privately controlled) might actors be able to expect their contributions will be safe.
Second, even where rent-seeking is not the primary motivation of officials, weak institutions also make it difficult to monitor the implementation of public policy by state officials. Without strong oversight and accountability mechanisms, low-level bureaucrats are free to shirk their duties and selectively enforce laws and regulations in ways that minimize their effort and maximize their rents (Beazer, 2012 , McNollGast, 1987 , Weingast and Moran, 1983 . develops the implications of this argument for social policy, arguing that as institutional quality declines low-level bureaucrats are less likely to fulfill basic duties, such as tax collection. As with the rent-seeking logic above, rampant tax evasion decreases the available pool of funds for social policy, forcing those who are unable to evade taxes to pay more for fewer benefits.
As before, only where private actors are able to control the collection and distribution of social policy might they be able to escape the problem of weak institutions. Again, extending and adapting the logic of deadweight costs, this shirking logic suggests that support for social policy decreases as bureaucrats are more able to shirk.
These perspectives both suggest that a simple extension of existing models of preferences for social policy to handle institutional quality would predict:
H 1 : As institutional quality deteriorates, firm support for generous, state controlled social policy decreases (unconditional opposition logic).
While extending existing models of preferences for social policy to weak institutional settings yields clear testable predictions, it rests on strong assumptions. All actors are assumed to be bearing an evenly distributed tax burden and to share equally in the dead-weight costs of social policy. This need not be the case, however. Those that are able to reduce their dead-weight costs or that are able to contribute less, relative to others, may benefit more from poor institutions (or at least lose less) than they would otherwise.
Put another way, poor institutions create unique opportunities to shift costs for those able to take advantage of them. While such firms may exist in settings with good institutions, poor institutions make it easier to engage in such strategies by loosening constraints meant to check such behavior.
In this paper, I explore two groups who can engage in such cost-shifting. First, some firms can create relationships with politicians that create de facto accountability, allowing them to protect themselves and take advantage of others. As a general rule, a large body of work has shown that firms with strong political connections generally seem to prosper in settings with poor institutions (Faccio, 2006 , Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell, 2006 , Frye and Iwasaki, 2011 , Hellman, 1998 . For politicians, such well-connected firms can provide the necessary resources to insure stable revenues (and sources of rents) they need to retain power.
Given their importance to bureaucrats, such firms can often count on their connections to ensure privileged access to public goods, such as social policy, and measures to protect their investments (Gehlbach, 2008, Slinko, Yakovlev, and Zhuravskaya, 2005) . Consequently, ceteris paribus politically connected firms can use the privilege of connections to defray the dead-weight costs of poor institutions, which in turn should increase their support for social policy relative to the unconnected.
H 2 : Firms' preferences for generous, state-controlled social policy increases along with their ability to use connections to defray the dead-weight costs of poor institutions (privilege logic).
Second, as noted above, the absence of constraints on government officials encourages them to shirk responsibility and cut-back on effort. Consequently, those who are harder for the state to track and monitor -those with mobile assets and those in the informal economy -can take advantage of bad institutions to free-ride on whatever benefits are provided, since officials have few incentives to find tax evaders and compel them to pay. Thus, poor institutions allow some firms to decrease their contributions towards social policy. So long as there are universal or quasi-universal benefits being offered, they can free-ride on the social policy system. If savings from tax evasion outweigh the dead-weight costs of poor institutions, such firms will ceteris paribus support social policy more than the average firm.
H 3 : Firms' preferences for generous, state-controlled social policy increases along with their ability to free-ride on social policy (free-riding logic).
Before moving on, it is important to make one caveat about the relationship between privilege, freeriding, and poor institutions. In this paper, I motivate my discussion of privilege and free-riding by pointing to the fact that both of these strategies are enabled in poor institutional settings, where there are few constraints on government officials. This need not be the case, however. Even in relatively well-institutionalized settings such as the United States and Western Europe, the ability to glean favors from political friends and to evade taxes is not entirely absent. Consequently, one could easily observe a relationship between wellconnected firms and tax-evaders in these countries and support for social policy. I do not discount this possibility theoretically and, due to data limitations, I cannot test it directly. Nonetheless, I argue that the magnitude of the effect of privilege and free-riding should be stronger in settings with poor institutional constraints, which provide more fertile ground for firms to turn connections and tax evasion into benefits. 9 3 Russian Social Policy Provision and Institutions: 1990 -2004 Before turning to the empirical section of this paper, it is worthwhile to briefly review the context in which the firm survey used in the analysis was conducted. As noted in the introduction of this paper, in 2005, Russia's institutional environment was rather bleak in comparison to international averages. This generally poor institutional environment at the national level reflected sub-national realities, as well. Looking at corruption at the regional level, figure 1 provides summary data from a 2005 survey of 4,350 firms in 80
Russian regions on the percentage of firms reporting that regional bureaucrats "often" engage in illegal 9 I take this question up again in the conclusion of this paper. 8 activity. The survey organization reported that this was generally perceived as a question about corruption (Vainberg and Rybnikova, 2006) . 10 On average (the blue line in the figure), 16% of firms reported that their regional bureaucrats were engaged in illegalities. As the figure demonstrates, however, there was a wide degree of variation, with 11 regions having shares higher than 30% and 25 reporting below 10%. Turning attention to another facet of poor institutions, the extent to which firms feel that their investments are at risk due to political opportunism and economic risks, paints a more nuanced picture. Figure 2 shows variation across Russia's 89 regions in investment risk ratings given by the financial consulting firm RA Expert. 11 The average rating on the index is 1.2 (the blue line in the figure), with most regions falling below that figure. 12 As a rule, most regions cluster narrowly around 1, which is the level of investment risk for Russia as a whole and only 23 regions score better than the sample mean. This implies that at least in terms of investment risk, variation was rather low. Finally, figure 3 provides some insight into a final measure of institutional quality, state-capacity, by providing a summary of non-resource taxes as a percentage of total regional income for all of Russia's regions. It is worth noting that there is a wide range of own tax income in total tax income, which ranges from less than 10% in Ingushentia (one of the Russia's restive Caucus regions) to 81% in Lipesk (a manufacturing 10 While not ideal, this survey is one of the few surveys contemporaneous to the one used in this paper that asks about corruption in a large number of Russian regions. 11 The rating encapsulates political, legal, economic, financial, social, and ecological risks into an index that rates the total risk of Russia (as a country) as 1 and all regions in relation to that.
12 This is in part caused by the outlier regions of the Caucuses, where conflicts and insurgency in the 1990's and early 2000's created massive investment risks. The weak institutional environment of the time forms the backdrop for understanding debates about the social policy system. In 2005 the Russian welfare state had just undergone an extended period of transition and reform. The massive economic shock of the early 1990s placed enormous fiscal strains on the government at the same time it dried up revenue streams. By the mid 1990's, it was clear that both the health and pension systems, which were designed for a full-employment command economy, were completely unsustainable. Sharp declines in wages, rapid population aging, widespread unemployment, and rapid expansion of the informal economy undermined state financing (Dobronogov and Mayhew, 2000 , Haggard and Kaufman, 2008 , Jensen, 2004 , Williamson, Howling, and Maroto, 2006 . Weak institutional controls over the bureaucracy responsible for collecting taxes and administering social policy exacerbated these problems, as officials were willing to turn a blind eye to tax evasion in exchange for rent-seeking opportunities and political favors (Cook, 2007 , Shleifer and Treisman, 2000 , Treisman, 1999 The solution adopted by the Russian government in the early 1990s was to move the bulk of its social responsibilities into four off-budget funds -for pensions, health care, disability and childcare, and unemployment -financed through a 37% payroll tax for employers and 1% for employees (Remington, 2011 , Twigg, 1998 . While this shifted social policy off the government's balance sheet and resolved the fiscal drain, it did little to solve the underlying problems with the system. The replacement rate of pensions through much of the 90s for most pensioners was between 30 and 40% of their average wage, which by 1999 was only around 60 to 70% of the subsistence minimum (Buckley, 1997, Williamson, Howling, and Maroto, 2006) . Only a small percentage of individuals received unemployment benefits, which were set far below subsistence minimums due to underfunding. Most did not even bother to apply (Cerami, 2009 , Cook, 2007 .
Most of the problems with the social policy system in the 1990's stemmed from the inability of the government to collect taxes properly. On the one hand, many individuals responded to unemployment and new market opportunities by entering the shadow economy, causing massive revenue shortfalls. On the other hand, many employers in the formal sector responded to high payroll taxes and new competitive pressures with tax evasion (Ovtcharova, and Popova , 2001, Yakovlev , 2001) . Such evasion was normally accomplished through collusion between employers and employees, where official wages were under-reported in exchange for premiums in the form of unreported cash payments or income from untaxable sources (Dmitriev and Maleva, 1997, Treisman, 1999) . Evasion was so rampant that Cook (2007) estimates that between a third and half of all workers avoided making contributions to the social funds during the 1990s. Poor institutional oversight exacerbated these problems, as employers were often shielded from formal taxation by regional authorities (Gehlbach, 2008) In response to growing concern, the Russian authorities embarked on an audacious series of reforms in the early 2000s. First, the system of payroll tax payments was substantially simplified. Rather than paying separately into four different funds, each with its own bureaucracy, employers switched to single Unified Social Tax. Further, the government decided to set a lower, flat payroll tax in order to streamline payment and lower incentives for evasion (Cook, 2007, Nies and Walcher, 2002) . Combined with other modifications to the tax code, the Unified Social Tax resulted in a 30% increase in tax collections in the first five months after the reform, an effect widely attributed to firms being incentivized to exit the shadow economy (Remington, 2011) .
Second, in conjunction with the tax reforms, the government also altered the relationship of social policy to the federal budget and created opportunities for private sector involvement. Health care, for example, was removed from the purview of the national budget and devolved to regional off-budget funds with dedicated tax revenues. Private insurance funds were brought in to negotiate with local service providers on behalf of these regional funds (Burger, Field, and Twigg, 1998, Twigg, 1998) . Pensions were also nominally extracted from the federal budget and placed under the responsibility of a central fund: the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation (PFRF). The PFRF continued to manage the existing universal, solidaristic minimum benefit payments, while citizens were given a choice between public (i.e. PFRF) or private management of a newly introduced notional defined contribution (Afanasiev, 2003, Williamson, Howling, and Maroto, 2006) .
Adoption of the private system was somewhat hampered, however, by the unwillingness of the state to guarantee funds outside the PFRF's control (Chandler , 2004 , Sokhey , 2010 .
What were the implications of the Russian system for preferences for social policy in 2005? Prior to reform, the populace almost universally regarded the pension system as inadequate for providing oldage security. Although the reforms were helpful in resolving some of the most blatant problems with the pension system, the ratio between nominal average pensions and wages for the median region was about half in 2000 and fell to less than one-third in the mid-2000s. Repeated efforts by the government to cope by raising minimum guaranteed payouts were largely unsuccessful (Remington, 2011) . For health care, the obligatory basic insurance coverage promised by the state did not provide much in the way of advanced care, nor did the quality of care provided improve much (Cerami, 2009 ). More importantly, regional governments were often left in charge of covering health insurance for the unemployed, exposing these groups to the vagaries of regional budgeting (Wagstaff, 2009) . Institutionally both the health-care and pension system were plagued by accusations of corruption, mis-management of funds, and outright theft on the part of both public and private providers (Burger, Field, and Twigg, 1998 , Cook, 2007 , Twigg, 1998 . Both systems also retained universal components, allowing free-riders to derive benefits without contributing.
From employers' perspective, the social policy system circa 2005 therefore provided uncertain labor market benefits. On the one hand, the relative inadequacy of the basic state-run system meant that firms were forced to offer supplementary benefits or wage premiums in order to attract highly skilled workers (Remington, 2011) . For larger firms, who could set up their own pension and insurance funds, the mixed system facilitated high-skill labor market strategies. 13 Unfortunately, many employers such systems remained vulnerable to predatory officials and opportunistic policy reversals designed to favor the state-run system. 14 On the other hand, because many of the problems of the system stemmed from inadequate benefits provision, an increase in funding could ceteris paribus make it an efficacious part of broader labor market strategy. This created a tension for smaller firms, since the lack of good institutional monitoring mechanisms meant contributions could be mismanaged by either state or other private actors. 15 In either case, however, the framework introduced above suggests that firms that could protect themselves or free-ride might be able to derive benefits despite the drawbacks of poor institutions. Testing these insights will be the task of the remainder of this paper.
Data and Methodology
In order to test the hypotheses laid out in section 2, I employ a survey of 666 Russian executives 16 in eleven regions that was conducted in 2005. The survey covers 23 industrial sectors, excluding agriculture and communal, health, and social services. Firms were randomly selected based on a stratified design, resulting in a survey that roughly mirrors the size and sectoral composition of the national economy. 17 The timing of the survey is of particular note, because the survey was conducted after reforms to the health care system and final enabling legislation for the 2001 pension reform had been passed. As noted above, this made private control a realistic possibility for the first time and gave firms exposure to private and public systems of controlling social policy. Survey instruments designed to parse out preferences for government control would therefore have been salient and topical to respondents. At the same time, be-cause the survey was conducted during controversies over the withdrawal of non-monetary social benefits and the implementation of pension reforms, social policy generosity was salient for both the populace and enterprises.
In order to measure preferences for social policy, I make use of the following survey instrument as my dependent variable: "In society there are different views about the scale of funding for the social sphere and the direction of its development. Which of the following statements do you agree with?" 1. It is necessary to increase social spending by increasing taxes and mandatory payments 2. It is necessary to maintain social spending at the same level, leaving taxes and mandatory payments at the same level 3. It is necessary to reduce social spending while reducing taxes and mandatory payments
Hard to say
For my purposes, this instrument has a number of valuable features. First, the reference in the original Russia to "the social sphere" would have been a cue to respondents to consider state-run social policy, as the term is rarely used in conjunction with private programs or funds. Most would likely understand that expansion of the system and state control are at the heart of this question. Second, the instrument directly evokes taxation policy in both the question and responses. In doing so, it forces respondents to think carefully about the cost trade-offs inherent in providing more generous social policies and how these costs affect the firm (Kenworthy and McCall , 2008) . Finally, this question is also helpful in that it is rather vague about the types of "social policy" being funded. Normally, this sort of wording is problematic, as respondents may have very different programs in mind when answering. In the present context, this ambiguity is helpful, as it avoids focusing on specific types of risk and emphasizes control. This being said, if there is deep heterogeneity in preferences for social policy across different risk dimensions, results based on this question may mask it.
There are two main challenges when dealing with this survey instrument. First, the question wording makes it difficult to distinguish between firms who do not trust the state to provide social policy and those who simply believe taxes are too high. Fortunately, the survey includes questions that allow for controls on the appetite of firms for spending and ideological attitudes. As a consequence, it is possible to isolate social policy preferences. Second, many firms availed themselves of the "hard to say" option, with 26% of the Consequently, I deal with this issue by lumping "hard to say" answers in with those who answered that the status quo is appropriate. 18 All told approximately 22% of the sample of firms supported increases in social spending along with a higher tax burden to support it, while about 15% of firms preferred a decrease in both social spending and the tax burden. Figure 4 summarizes the dependent variable across the 11 regions in the survey sample, with regions sorted according to the regional average of a question about perceptions of corruption taken from the same survey. 19 The regional distribution of answers is quite striking. In the Republic of Bashkortostan, for example, only 2% of firms support increases in government controlled social spending, whereas in Moscow 36% of firms do. Strikingly, these are the regions with the highest and lowest levels of perceived corruption according to this survey. Nonetheless, the relationship is not straightforward, as figure 4 indicates. As noted in the previous section, this is likely because Russian institutions are uniformly poor.
Section 2 posited a number of hypotheses about the ways in which firms win and lose from social policy under poor institutional conditions. In order to explore firms' preferences for social policy, I begin by estimating a simple ordered probit model with fixed effects for regions and sectors and cluster corrected standard errors. 20 The probit model has the structural form:
where D i is a vector of individual, firm-level characteristics of interest for firm i, X i is a vector of firm-level controls (discussed below), ρ r and χ s are vectors of regional fixed effects (for region r) and sector fixed effects (for sector s), and i is the error term.
Measuring Privilege and Free-riding
The hypotheses developed in Section 2 suggest that in poor institutional environments, firms will be more likely to support social policy if they are insulated from the dead-weight costs of poor institutions, whether due to the privileges that come with connections or the ability to free-ride on the contributions of others. In order to test these two perspectives, I make use of several measures. First, the privilege perspective suggests that one way in which firms may be able to defend themselves from the costs of poor institutions is to take advantage of connections to the government. Unfortunately, in this survey there are no direct questions about the relationship of the firm manager to regional officials or the presence of state officials on the firms' executive board. To get at these connections, I make use of questions about the ownership structure of firms to create a dummy variable indicating state ownership of firms. Straightforwardly, my theory would predict that firms with state ownership should be strongly connected to key politicians, since the later -in their role as public servants -own the former outright. Indeed, government (and government appointed) officials are a prominent feature on the boards of directors for these types of firm (Frye and Iwasaki, 2011) .
Existing work provides some evidence that state ownership is enough of a political connection to allow firms to derive benefits unavailable to others. Although such firms may be required to feed profits into the provision of local jobs, social policy, or government budgets, such firms are also more likely to benefit from the selective provision of public goods and additional property rights protections (Gehlbach, 2008, Juurikkala and Lazareva , 2006) . In Russia, such firms also tend to benefit from preferential tax treatment by the authorities, better access to government orders, and access to credit, all of which can help them to mitigate both the actual costs of social policy and the potential damage to firm competitiveness of tax increases to pay for it (Frye and Iwasaki, 2011) . Indeed, when asked about how different companies would react to tax increases to pay for greater social policy, the head of a major Russian business association said:
All employers are well aware that increases in taxes -this is a decrease in their income. Maybe not by 100%, but by 50 for sure. Especially in small companies and in companies in the private sector. Everyone understands that this doesn't concern large government firms, they can just absorb the new rates. But what can the rest of us do? (Interview BA2-20131007) At the same time flows from longer term social policy, particularly pensions, were available to the government as cheap credit (Entry 19, 205, 259, 330, 526, 700) . During debates about pension reform in the early 2000's there was a great deal of fear that this cheap credit would be misused by the government as a means of rapidly increasing spending and increasing support for, and investment in, state-owned firms. 21 As Andrei Godzinski, president of the Eastern Finance Company notes, there were few controls on such funds:
The reform (of the pension system) has created one outrage. This is that money is being transfered to Vnesheconombank (a major government owned investment bank) -this is an outrage squared. Why did they (the government) do this? To collect for themselves massive resources that they can spend without control. (Entry 902)
Indeed, one of the government's major responses to the 2008 financial crisis was to engage in massive deficit spending in order to provide bailouts to troubled state-owned firms, in addition to measures aimed at the financial sector and regional governments (Gurvich et al., 2010 , Vartapetov, 2011 .
With respect to social policy, these types of benefits -privileged access to public goods, property rights, credit, and government support -are all important, because they provide firms with comparative advantages vis-a-vis other firms that help them lower costs and risk. Consequently, firms with the ability to take advantage of their connections in various ways are much less sensitive to the costs associated with tax increases and are therefore more likely to support social policy expansions that may strengthen skill supply in the labor pool.
It is important to note that a dummy for state owned firms is a somewhat noisy measure. Fully stateowned firms, in particular, are likely to differ from their private counterparts on a host of dimensionsideology, competitiveness, budget constraints -that may influence preferences for social policy through channels other than privilege. Nonetheless, this is one of the easiest and most reliable measures of connections as proxied by ownership. 22 . I explore alternative interpretations of this variable, as well as attempt to illustrate what types of advantages state-owned firms are receiving, extensively in Section 5.1.
I also measure privilege more indirectly by looking at outcomes that should be associated with political connections. One proxy is through the use of a survey instrument that asks firms whether they make sales to the government. In Russia, government sales are often used as a way of rewarding firms for good behavior, particularly with respect to mobilizing the electorate in favor of Kremlin-supported candidates (Frye, Reuter, and Szakonyi , 2014, ?) . That firms receive these rewards is both a reflection of the importance of the firms to the government, and the possibility that these firms may be of sufficient value to receive other government favors. Another indirect proxy is through a survey instrument that asks firms if they attempt to influence new laws and normative acts important to their business and to what extent they are successful. Intuitively, firms who lobby and believe they exert great influence are likely to benefit from political connections and previous work on the effect of political connections has used survey instruments of this type in analysis (Slinko, Yakovlev, and Zhuravskaya, 2005) . Because social policy is mostly overseen at the federal and regional levels, I use survey instruments that capture firms' lobby behavior and evaluation of their own success at these two levels.
A second proxy is firms' confidence in being able to successfully resolve disputes against the government Privileged protection of property rights from the government is one of the most important privileges firms can receive from the state in poor institutional environments and an important determinant of willingness to invest (Gehlbach, 2008 , Gehlbach and Keefer, 2011 , Haber, 2007 , Haber, Maurer, and Razo, 2003 .
I capture this by using an instrument that asks firms about their confidence in winning a court case when the 22 Compare studies such as Iwasaki (2011), Gehlbach (2008) to studies that use more elaborate criteria, such as Faccio (2006) . The later make strong assumptions about ownership and connections while also relying on a non-anonymous sample. Such techniques are difficult to replicate with survey data. counter party is the regional government 23 Although this measure does not directly reflect connections between the firm and government, the ability to successfully defend oneself from regional governments implies endowments some sort of alliance with those in key government positions given the relative dependence of the judicial system on executives at the regional level. While, this variable is potentially endogenous, particularly due to its associations with other forms of leverage (size, market power, etc.) that might help in protecting firms, once one controls for these features, it can provide evidence that firms' ability to defend themselves from predation -rather than ability to free-ride -governs their preferences for social policy.
Testing the free-rider perspective is a bit more complex, as the survey used in this paper offers no instruments that directly tap traditional measures of the ability to free-ride. Factor mobility, for example, can only be measured using coarse sector fixed effects, which are themselves highly correlated with other determinants of preferences for social policy such as skill profile. Similarly, firm size is highly correlated with sector, with the largest firms in the sample generally belonging to the oil and gas sector and heavy manufacturing and the smallest to the retail sector. 24 Moreover, firm size is likely to be correlated with other factors -the ability of firms to take advantage of economies of scale, lobbying capacity, ability to provide officials with rents, political connections -that may influence preferences for social policy along other channels. 25 Indeed, existing work has found that large firms are more likely to capture and be captured by state officials, particularly in post-communist states like Russia (Gehlbach, 2008 , Hellman, 1998 . Consequently, firm size is difficult to interpret and could actually proxy for both political connections and free-riding.
One available proxy, however, is the extent to which firms face harassment by regulatory authorities.
The more a firm is inspected by the authorities, the more difficult it should be to hide critical tax-related information -sales, number of employees, and employee salaries -for the purposes of tax evasion. Indeed, World Bank (2011) has shown that this measure is strongly correlated with susceptibility to bribery and firms' ability to evade taxes in the Post-communist world. Using a question that directly asks firms about the number of inspections they have face in the last two years, I generate a measure which captures the logged number of inspections that firms have experienced in the last year. 26 It is important to note, however, that this measure is not a perfect proxy and has potentially ambiguous interpretations. While I argue that firms that can avoid inspection by the authorities may be less visible (and therefore more able to evade 23 The survey instrument asks, "Can your firm defend its legal interest through negotiations, without use of the arbitration courts, in economic disputes with [the executive branch of your region/federal agencies]?" 24 Pairwise correlations between firm size and these sectors are 0.2756 (oil and gas), 0.2646 (heavy manufacturing), and -0.2753 (retail). All these correlations are significant at the 99.99% level. 25 Section 5.1 demonstrates the multi-faceted effects of firm size empirically. 26 The precise question wording is, " In the last year, how many times was your firm subjected inspections from government organs (fire safety, sanitary, etc.)?" taxes) than other firms, it could be that politically well-connected firms are able to use their privileges to avoid inspection. This would be consistent with the privilege story, rather than the free-riding story. I address this ambiguity directly in the Section 5.1.
Controls
In addition to the variables of substantive interest noted above, I also include controls for a number of basic firm level characteristics: the logged number of employees at the firm, whether the firm exported products in the previous year, firms' labor costs as a percentage of total production costs, whether competition from other firms poses a problem for firm development, and whether or not the firm provides supplementary pensions and health care policies. 27 I also include a measure of competitiveness -whether the firm reported profits in the previous year. I supplement this with a question about the degree to which credit constraints hamper the firms' development, as this variable is important to understanding the degree of flexibility firms have in meeting competing priorities (expansion, wage bills, taxes, etc.) while under budget constraints.
In addition, ownership structure is an important predictor of firm behavior in a wide variety of surveys of Eastern European firms. 28 I include a series of dummy variables indicating whether firms were incorporated into the private sector, incorporated as state-owned firms and completely privatized, incorporated as stateowned firms but only partially privatized (e.g. the state has some ownership stake) or as a private firm and then partially taken over by the state, or is wholly state-owned. Finally, as a means of controlling for potential unobserved heterogeneity due to selection of certain types of executives into certain types of firms, I also control for key individual level characteristics that have proven robust in nearly all studies -manager's age, level of education, and gender -in my main specifications (Alesina and Guiliano , 2011) . 29 .
I also include control variables of greater substantive interest. Existing studies posit that firms' preferences for social policy are governed by firms' labor market needs (Mares , 2003a , Swensen, 2002 . Conceptually, existing work tends to treat this variable as a means of measuring the relative skill intensity of firms and their demand for skilled labor (Thelen, 2004) . Unfortunately, no such measure exists on my survey instrument. Instead, I make use of a related measure that captures firms' bargaining power vis-a-vis their employees. Conceptually, the easier it is for a given firm to meet its demand for skilled labor, the less labor market constraints should govern its preferences. 27 These are generally offered as complements to the universal government programs in Russia. 28 For examples, c.f. Beazer (2012), Frye (2006) , Iwasaki (2011), Frye, Reuter, and Szakonyi (2014) , Gimpel'son and Zudina (2012) .
29 See paper 2, Table 2 , for a complete list of supporting studies 20
As a simple proxy for the degree to which labor market considerations bind, I use a variable which captures the difficulty that firms have in finding qualified managers. I select this measure as opposed to an instrument asking about difficulty in finding qualified workers for two reasons. First, the survey uses a term for qualified specialists (kvalifitsirovannie rabotchi) that can apply broadly to white and blue-collar specialists that require advanced education and white-and blue-collar specialists who require small amounts of on-the-job training. As work on labor markets in Russia has amply demonstrated, however, the labor market needs of firms for these more narrowly defined types of specialists varies considerably: the former tend to be scarce, while the later are abundant (Gimpel'son, Kapeliushnikov, and Lukiyanova, 2010, Tan , 2007, ?). As such, this measure is a good proxy for firms' bargaining power vis-a-vis local labor markets and other firms. To the extent that managers are in high demand, success in finding managers is likely to be strongly correlated with the ability to find the sorts of high skill individuals that existing literature highlights, but which the ambiguity of the survey instrument on "qualified workers" discussed above obscures. Table 1 presents the main results of the paper. Model 1.1 introduces the baseline model, which includes the full set of controls outlined in section 4.2 and the ownership dummy variables. Consistent with the privilege logic outlined in section 2, the co-efficient of the dummy for state ownership is positive and significant at conventional levels.
Results
With respect to the control variables, model 1.1 indicates that labor market concerns are statistically significant predictors of firms' support for state-controlled social policy. As expected, firms with difficulties in attracting qualified managers are more likely to support increased state-controlled social policy spending, which is consistent with existing work that highlights the importance of firms' difficulties in meeting demand for skilled labor in the formation of social policy preferences (Mares , 2003a , Swensen, 2002 . Labor costs as a share of total revenue have the opposite effect, with firms that spend a larger share of revenue on labor being more likely to oppose increases in social policy spending at conventional significance levels. This result is also unsurprising, since firms with high labor costs are unlikely to be sympathetic to tax increases that would further increase the share of firm spending on labor costs.
Other control variables, such as firm size and export orientation, are not significant at conventional levels in most specifications. These results are somewhat odd, given predictions in the existing literature, particularly for firm size. This may be partially due to the fact, noted above, that firm size is simultaneously correlated with firms political power in Russia and with their visibility to tax authorities -potentially countervailing effects. Indeed, only when one controls for inspections (model 1.5), a measure of visibility, does firm size become a significant predictor of support for social policy. As one would expect from the privilege logic, it is a positive predictor. I discuss this curious result below, when I validate the other substantive variables of interest and show how they relate to various benefits connections may bring and potential taxation issues. Finally, it should be noted that managers' characteristics were insignificant predictors of firms' attitudes towards social policy. 30 This result mitigates some concerns that answers to the social policy question reflect the personal preferences of managers, rather than of firms, since age, gender, and education are typically all extremely robust predictors of individuals' preferences for social policy and redistribution (c.f.
Alesina and Guiliano (2011)).
Model 1.2 introduces the dummy variable indicating whether the firm sells products to the government.
Recall that government sales are highly political in Russia and are often used as a way to reward firms.
Both are likely to require strong connections that may be useful in mitigating the costs of poor institutions.
As suggested by the privilege logic, firms with government sales are indeed more likely to support social policy, although only at the 90% confidence level. By contrast, the measures indicating that firms lobby the government and confidence in their ability to protect their property rights vis-a-vis regional governments in court (models 1.3 and 1.4 respectively) are not significant at conventional levels. Taken together, therefore, the first four models in table ?? provide some support for the privilege perspective, although the lack of significance for the lobbying and court variables implies that the precise nature of the privileges being obtained (and their link to social policy) are hard to pin down. Property rights protection, at least, are unlikely to be the mechanism at play.
Model 1.5 introduces the proxy for free-riding, the log number of inspections the firm has experienced in the last calendar year. As expected, log inspections are a negative and significant predictor of support for 30 These are omitted from the reported results in table 1, but are available upon request.
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social policy -the more a firm has been inspected, the less it supports increased state-controlled social policy spending. As noted above, this result is consistent with both the protection and the free-riding perspectives discussed in Section 2. On the one hand, firms that are inspected more often may not face government inspections due to protection from state allies, a form of privilege that allows them to deflect some of the dead-weight costs of poor institutional settings. On the other hand, firms that are less subject to inspection may also be better at hiding themselves from the government, allowing them to more easily evade taxes and free-ride. I attempt to distinguish between these interpretations in the next section.
Finally, model 1.6 checks whether the results of the previous models may have been due to selection effects. I make use of a simple logit model, in which the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the firm responded "hard to say" to the social policy expansion question and the right hand side consists of the set of controls from the previous models and the two main, significant independent variables of interest: the state ownership dummy and log inspections. None of these variables is a significant predictor of answering "hard to say", indicating that results are unlikely to be due to selection effects. 31
Figure 5: Substantive Effects of Individual Level Predictors of Support or Social Policy
Before checking interpretations of the variables of interest, it is useful to examine the substantive effects.
Figure 5 provides a sense of the relative predictive power of the log inspections variable and the state 31 These results are also consistent with the fact that these results are more or less missing at random. In unreported regressions, I engage in list-wise deletion of firms that answered "hard to say" does not substantially alter results. Omitting these firms does not substantially change reported results. 23 ownership dummy in comparison to the other statistically significant controls. 32 For each variable, the figure shows the first difference in the predicted probability that a firm supports more social policy spending and higher taxes when all variables are held to their median value and the continuous variables of interest are adjusted to its 90th percentile value. First differences for the state ownership dummy variable were taken between state owned firms and the reference category (fully private, never privatized firms).
Interestingly, the substantive effect of the state ownership variable is by far the largest, with state owned firms being about 9.8% more likely to support state social policy than other firms. Log inspections had a smaller, but still large effect, making firms about 6% less likely to support social policy spending increases as one goes from a median level of inspections to a particularly high one. These effects are as strong or stronger than the effects of going from a median to an acute level of need for managers (4.9% more likely to favor social policy), from a median to a particularly large firm size (5.1% more likely to favor social policy), and from median to particularly high labor costs is larger than the effect of inspections (5.1% less likely to support social policy). While most of these effects may seem objectively small, it is important to note that effect sizes of 3-4% are large in comparison to the types of substantive effects generally identified in the individual level literature, even when going from the median to the 90th percentile. Rehm (2009) , for example, estimates the probability of support for social policy to decreases by about 5% as one goes from the median to the 90th percentile in income and increases by 6% and and 3% as one goes from the median to the 90th percentile in occupational unemployment rates and skill specificity respectively.
Finally, in order to insure the robustness of these results and guard against the possibility that variation in the tightness of local labor markets shapes firm preferences for social policy, I reran the models above using multi-level models that account for local labor market conditions. In these specifications, I introduced regional level unemployment into the above specifications and controlled for social policy spending as a percentage of total regional spending. Since the legal framework for Russian social policy is set by the central government and formally the same across regions, the later is a good measure of variation in social policy. 33 This does not substantially change the results. I also took advantage of the fact that the survey was conducted in each region's capital city to explore labor markets at the micro-level. In particular, I introduce a measure of net migration into the city, a proxy for labor mobility, and of the employed share of the working age population. Again, neither variable changes the main results. Substantively, these tests yielded little insight into the effect of regional labor markets on preferences for social policy. This is to be 32 The figure was constructed using quasi-bayesian simulated predicted probabilities (and their 95% confidence intervals) derived from models 1.5. Simulations were obtained in R. 33 Results are omitted due to space concerns but are available upon request.
expected, as the small number of 2nd level (here regional) units severely biases estimates of both standard errors and co-efficients. While corrections exist, they tend to work poorly for applications with fewer than 20 observations (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller, 2008, Leoni , 2009 ).
Evaluating Alternative Interpretations
Two of the main variables of interest -the state ownership variable and the log inspections variable -are potentially subject to endogeneity and interpretation issues. In this section, I provide some additional tests in order to show that the interpretations offered in the previous section are valid, that both variables are capturing the intended concepts, and that the results of the previous section offer some support for both the privilege and free-riding perspectives. Table 2 begins by offering a few tests designed to insure that the results attributed to the state-ownership and inspections variables are not due to factors unobserved in those tests. Unfortunately, there is no way to create good instruments for either of these variables from the survey, therefore the only option is to attempt to control for major categories of unobservables. One of the main differences between state and privately owned firms is that the former may be able to count on state support, relaxing their budget constraints and allowing them to support otherwise unprofitable policies (Kornai, 1986) . Model 2.1 attempts to account for soft budget constraints by introducing a measure of the extent to which firms are confident that federal, regional, or local authorities would provide aid to them in the event of financial difficulties. 34 The more firms are certain that aid will be forthcoming, the more likely that soft budget constraints are guiding their decisions. This variable is positive, as expected, but insignificant at conventional levels. It does decrease the significance and magnitude of the state ownership dummy (although not below the 10% level), however. This is consistent with the notion that fully state owned firms believe that their political connections will allow them to derive government aid and mitigate the costs of social policy expansions in a poor institutional setting.
One may also worry that state-owned firms are less competitive than other firms, leading them to seek out government subsidies. The main specification includes a measure of profitability, a good marker of competitiveness, but this may not fully capture differences in the ability to compete. Model 2.2 includes additional measures of competitiveness, including whether firms were able to engage in capital investment, open new product lines, or received foreign investment in the last two years. None of these variables are sig-nificant and they have no effect on the state dummy variable. This suggests that variation in competitiveness is not driving the results. State owned firms might also differ from their private counterparts in that they are expected to contribute informally to regional budgets and programs in exchange for favors (Gehlbach, 2008 , Treisman, 1999 . This may cause them to favor expansions of state-run social policy simply to decrease the burden that they bear from such programs. It might also cause them to oppose such programs as additional burdens on firm funds. Model 2.3 introduces a series of dummy variables equal to one if firms reported that they provided aid to regional agencies, regional pension funds, regional unemployment programs, or regional construction programs. Inclusion of these variables has little effect on the full state-ownership dummy's co-efficient and all are not significant at conventional levels.
Managers of state-owned firms might also have different ideological leanings than their counterparts in private firms. In this case, differences between state-owned firms and private ones reflect the ideology of managers, not characteristics of the firms themselves. While the main specifications control for manager level characteristics, model ??.4 introduces additional measures related to government spending. Firms were asked whether they supported increases, decreases, or status quo levels of spending on police forces, the judiciary, and education. 35 Of these, only preferences for education spending are a significant predictor of support for social policy spending at conventional levels, with the co-efficient being positive, as expected.
Even with the inclusion of the variables, however, the state-ownership dummy remains positive and significant. Model 2.5 tackles ideology from a different direction, including dummy variables if respondents voted for the Communist Party, liberal parties (Yabloko or the Union of Right Forces), and a variable indicating the extent to which the respondent supports WTO accession. All are reasonable proxies for attitudes towards the market. Again, these have little effect on the state ownership dummy and none are significant at conventional levels.
Model 2.6 and 2.7 shift focus to the proxy for visibility -log inspections -in order to assess whether the effect attributed to this variable is due to other factors. Model 2.6 first verifies that inspections are not related to general perceptions of government competence, an alternative explanation inconsistent with the institutions based framework advanced here. I introduce two variables into the baseline model, which capture respondents' evaluation of the performance of their regional governor and regional executive bodies.
In this specification, the magnitude of the log number of inspections is actually larger than in previous estimates and remains significant at conventional levels. Moreover, the two proxies for firms' evaluation of local officials fail to reach significance at conventional levels. The link between inspections and opposition to 35 Note that these questions do not evoke taxation, so individuals are not reminded of the consequences of increased spending.
government-controlled social policy does not appear to be related to negative evaluations of the government.
Model 2.7 is a similar exercise that checks whether log institutions are a proxy for local bureaucratic discretion, a variable linked to expectations of rent-seeking and opportunism in the Eastern European context (Beazer, 2012) . I include an instrument indicating whether firms believe local bureaucrats have a high degree of discretion. Again, this variable alters neither the magnitude or the sign of the inspections variable.
Interestingly, the measure of perceptions of local bureaucratic discretion is a significant, positive predictor of support for social policy. While this is a somewhat puzzling result, it may be explainable if firms are able to make use of local corruption and bureaucratic discretion to attempt to ease their costs (or enhance their benefits) from social policy, even if such policies may exacerbate free-rider problems at the regional level. 36 Nonetheless, it is difficult to put too much weight on this variable, as it is endogenous to other factors.
While the results presented in table 2 mitigate endogeneity concerns somewhat, they do little to alleviate concerns about whether the state-ownership dummy and the inspections variable are valid measures of the privilege and visibility concepts discussed in section 2. Table 3 attempts to get at these concerns directly.
First, if the state ownership variable accurately captures the privilege logic, then we would expect it to be a significant predictor of the types of privileges that enable firms to mitigate costs associated with increased social policy spending: preferential protection of property rights, protection against corruption, and access to government subsidies in case of economic difficulties. Similarly, if the inspections variable captures power derived from political connections, rather than visibility, it should be associated with these variables as well.
Model 3.1 introduces as the dependent variable the ordinal measure of the degree to which firms are confident they can prevail in court when the regional government is a counter-party used in model 1.4.
Neither inspections or the state-ownership dummy are significant predictors, although both have the signs the privilege logic would predict. Model 3.2 introduces as a dependent variable a measure of the extent to which firms believe regional level bribery is a problem for firms with related economic activity, a formulation typically use by the World bank to mitigate sensitivity concerns about questions on corruption (c.f. BEEPS 2012). Consistent with the privilege perspective, state-owned firms are less likely to believe that corruption is a problem for their peer firms, implying they likely have some protection from regional predation.
Models 3.3 and 3.4 look at another privilege, often associated with political connections, that might make firms more predisposed towards supporting social policy: government support. Models 3.3 and Mod-els 3.4 introduce dummy measures that capture whether firms have received aid from regional and municipal governments (respectively) over the last two years. In these model 3.3, neither the state dummy or the inspections variable is significant at conventional levels. In models 3.4, however, the state ownership dummy is significant, indicating that state-owned firms are more likely to receive aid from municipal governments than other types of firms. Given that the regression controls for potential correlates of poor performance and the firms share of the labor pool (both of which might drive support even in the absence of political connections), this finding is consistent with the notion that state-owned firms can make use of connections to gain privileges for themselves. In this model, the inspections variable is not significant at conventional levels.
Finally, models 3.5 examines whether state-owned firms and those that are inspected often are more likely to make sales to the government. Again, consistent with the privilege perspective, state-owned firms are more likely to sell to the state, a potentially important source of rents and financial support even in tough times (Frye and Iwasaki, 2011) . Taken together and combined with results from table 2 that rule out the most obvious sources of omitted variable bias, models 3.1 -3.5 provide some support for the notion that the state-ownership dummy proxies for political connections. Consistent with work on the benefits of connections, state-owned firms are more likely to believe corruption is not a problem for firms like them, more likely to receive aid from local government, and more likely to make sales to the government.
Turning to visibility, we would expect that firms with higher visibility are more likely to have conflicts with the government over taxes. Model 3.6 introduces as the dependent variable a dummy variable that captures whether firms have had tax conflicts with the authorities in the last two years. Unsurprisingly, firms that receive fewer inspections are less likely to have tax conflicts, a result which holds at the 99% level. This is consistent with the notion that inspections are a measure of visibility, since firms able to evade inspections also seem to evade problems with the authorities. Interestingly, political connections do not seem to lessen tax conflict, as the only ownership dummy that is significant is the dummy for privatized firms with no residual government investment. State-ownership -whether partial or full -does not make for fewer tax conflicts than fully private firms, at least not at conventional significance levels.
The result for the inspection variable in model 3.6 is consistent with the interpretation of the variable as a function of firms' ability to hide, although it could also be due to the fact that firms that are rarely inspected simply follow all relevant laws. Model 3.7 introduces a measure of the extent to which firms believe following the law is conditional, which provide some leverage on whether firms are law-abiding or hiding. Inconsistent with the notion that firms that are inspected at low rates are more "law-abiding", the more often a firm is inspected, the more likely it believes that laws should be followed regardless of whether one agrees with them, a result which holds at the 5% level.
As a final test of the interpretation of the inspections variable, model 3.8 uses this measure as the dependent variable to explore the determinants of being inspected. If the number of inspections a particular firm experiences are a function of the firms' ability to leverage political connections as a defensive mechanism, then it should be correlated with the other potential measures of privilege discussed in this paper once one controls for variation in regulation density. 37 The dummy variables for state ownership is negative in model 3.8, consistent with the notion that connections may lower the number of inspections; however, the variable is insignificant at conventional levels. Consequently, it does not appear that firms that are wellconnected are able to use these connections to prevent inspections. Taken together with the other results presented in table 3, this lends support to the conceptual validity of inspections as a measure of firms' visibility to state organs, which is in turn a proxy for firms' ability to free-ride. 38 Before concluding, it is worth pointing out that table 3 helps to illustrate some of the ambiguities of the effect of firm size. Recall that section 4.1 claimed that firm size might be simultaneously a measure of privilege and of visibility. Consistent with the notion that large firms may benefit from political connections, firm size is positive and significant in models 3.1, indicating that larger firms are more likely to be able to prevail against regional government bodies in court. Similarly, large firms are more likely to receive government aid (both at the local and regional levels), results which hold at conventional levels. All of these results are subject to alternative interpretations, of course, but they are at least consistent with the notion that large firms can generate political connections and use them to receive protection of their property rights and benefits from the state. As noted above, existing work on business-state relations in the post-soviet space are also consistent with this story (c.f. Gehlbach (2008 ), Hellman (1998 ). Somewhat predictably, however, firm size is also associated with visibility. In models 3.6 and 3.8, firm size is a significant predictor of both a higher probability of tax conflict and a greater number of inspections (respectively). Given that firm size is therefore associated with both privilege and free-riding, which generate opposite predictions about the effect 37 I do this by introducing the variable measuring firms' perceptions of their regulatory burden discussed above. This is likely endogenous, but is the only way to measure variation in the extent to which sectors are regulated. Omitting this term does not change the results. 38 Another potential test is to look at whether sectors traditionally associated with tax evasion are also less likely to be inspected. In Russia, tax evasion tends to be correlated with particular (especially service sector) industries and firm size (i.e. small firms) (Gimpel'son and Zudina , 2012) . One must be cautious, however, since tax evasion and informality in Russia is characterized by both formal and informal components working side-by-side, which often results in both hidden production and hidden wages in unexpected places, such as large industrial firms (Dolgopiatova, 1998 , Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff , 2000 , Kaufman and Kaliberda , 1996 , Ovtcharova, and Popova , 2001 , Yakovlev , 2001 . Here I reject this approach, however, since sector dummies also proxy for a large number of factors other than propensity for tax evasion that may shape propensity to be inspected. of firm size on social policy preferences, it is unsurprising that this variable proved mostly insignificant at conventional levels in table 1, except for when we control for visibility directly (model 1.6).
Conclusion
This paper argues that poor institutional settings create opportunities that allow some firms to profit despite (or possibly because of) them. While the direct effect of institutions could not be tested due to data constraints, I develops implications of the argument to suggest that two groups are particularly well-positioned to take advantage of the loosening of constraints that goes hand-in-hand with poor institutions. On the one hand, individuals with privileged connections to the state can take advantage of these connections to protect themselves from abuses of the social policy system or to gain access to resources that mitigate any costs associated with poor institutions. On the other hand, individuals who can hide from state officials and evade taxes can free-ride on social policy -letting others pay the cost while they reap the benefits. While such groups may always be able to shift costs and free-ride, I argue this type of strategy is more likely in poor institutional settings, where officials are weakly constrained. Consistent with this argument, I find that well-connected firms -specifically state-owned firms -and those likely to be able to hide from the state -firms that experience low inspection rates -are more likely to support social policy in Russia in 2005, a setting with particularly poor institutional quality. These findings remain robust and consistent in the face of leading alternative interpretations of them and tests of the conceptual validity of the measures. This paper's findings provide two contributions. First, it joins a growing body of work that shows that some actors are able to adapt to poor institutional settings and find ways of profiting from the uncertainty and risk they bring (Boix and Svolik, 2013 , Gehlbach, 2008 , Gehlbach and Keefer, 2011 , Haber, Maurer, and Razo, 2003 , Magaloni, 2008 . These "winners" in poor institutional settings provide important and counterintuitive reservoirs of support for policies that seem particularly vulnerable to rent-seeking or time inconsistent preferences on the part of authorities, such as social policy. Second, in the case of social policy particularly, this paper advances our understandings of who supports the extension of government controlled social policy. Understanding who can profit from social policy even in the face of poor institutions is critical for understanding which groups form or join coalitions in support of the welfare state in such settings. As these coalitions appear to differ from those in the developing world, where strong institutional constraints make it harder to trade on political connections or evade taxes, we might expect very different outcomes. This research direction is a promising one for understanding the development and evolution of the authoritarian welfare state (Mares and Carnes , 2009 ).
An important caveat must be made, however. This paper took regional institutional quality as uniformly poor when examining the preferences of the politically connected and free-riders. This leaves the question of whether preferences vary according to institutional setting open. At various points in this paper, I have suggested that that free-riders everywhere may support the welfare state, so long as it is set up in ways that allow them to benefit. Similarly, the politically well-connected may be able to trade on the privileges of their connections to derive additional benefits from the welfare state regardless of institutional quality. Viewed in this light, institutional quality conditions preferences only in so far as it makes it easier to evade taxes or to trade on one's privileges. That is, tax evaders and the well-connected have the same preferences in strong and weak institutional settings, there are just more of both groups were institutions are poor. Unfortunately, the data at hand for this study is insufficient to resolve this difficulty. Future research must answer whether institutions condition preferences directly or merely create opportunities for certain groups to free ride. Cut-points for ordered probit models (Models 1-7) and intercept for OLS model 8 omitted due to space. Results available upon request. Manager characteristics are education, log age, and gender. Cluster corrected (region) standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 41 
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